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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.o<''~ LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
'JS• 
WATKINS & FABER, and· 
WALTER P. FABER, JR. , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19172 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 
SCM's statement that the "Facts have been mis-
characterized" by Appellant is simply untrue. The facts 
cited in Appellant's brief are accurate and uncontested and 
conclusively establish the basis for the two crucial questions 
in this case -- (1) Was Fischer's 1979 promise to Watkins & 
Faber for adjacent office space consideration for the signing 
0f the written 1979 lease?, and, if so, (2) Does Watkins & 
Faber have any remedy for SCM's refusal to keep the promise? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT PREVENT 
RESCISSION FOR REFUSAL OF THE PROMISE. 
SC!l's brief emphasizes the Statute of Frauds and 
~riues that there was not an enforceable oral contract for 
·~e 1djacent space, and therefore, Watkins & Faber has no 
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remedy whatever. Even assu1'11 1 ;_- ; 1 1;-r,,-::'f'. t 
that the oral promise for the acl) ,"icen t sµace c~u 2 d c.o t 
be specifically enforced because it was not in writing, 
there is no doubt that the promise was made and that it was 
specifically made to induce Watkins & Faber to sign the 
written lease of July 9, 1979. If, as SCM argues, Fischer's 
promise was meaningless, then in fairness the 1979 lease 
which would not have existed but for the promise should also 
be just as meaningless. Contrary to SCM's position that the 
promise had no value, it is undisputed that it had sufficient 
value to cause the 1979 lease to be signed. 
Because the promise induced Watkins & Faber to 
sign the 1979 lease, it should not be isolated as an independe~ 
transaction which might be unenforceable under the Statute 
of Frauds. Where valuable consideration was specifically 
given to obtain the promise, that consideration should be 
returned or cancelled if the promise is deemed not enforce-
able because of the Statute of Frauds. If SCM cannot be 
forced to enter into a lease agreement for the adjacent space, 
then Watkins & Faber should not be forced to continue per-
formance under the 1979 renewal lease. The Restatement of 
Contracts, Second, endorses legal principles applicable to 
this case. Section 141 states as follows: 
§141. Action for Value of Performance Under 
Unenforceable Contract. 
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(1) In an action for the value of 
performance under a contract, except as stated 
u1 Subsection (2), the Statute of Frauds does 
not invalidate any defense which would be avail-
able if the contract were enforceable against 
both parties. 
(2) Vlhere a party to a contract which is 
unenforceable against him refuses either to 
perform the contract or to sign a sufficient 
memorandum, the other party is justified in sus-
pending any performance for which he has not 
already received the agreed return, and such a 
suspension is not a defense in an action for 
the value of performance rendered before the 
suspension. [Emphasis added.] 
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate the 
defense of failure of consideration. Because SCM failed 
to provide the promised adjacent office space, Watkins & 
Faber was justified in suspending any further performance 
under the lease. 
Another provision of the Restatement of Contracts, 
Second, Section 139, directs itself to specific enforcement 
of oral promises. Even though Watkins & Faber is not seeking 
specific performance, the section emphasizes the principle 
that the Statute of Frauds will not be applied where injustice 
will occur. Section 139 states as follows: 
§139. Enforcement by Virtue of Action in 
Reliance. 
(1) A promise which the promiser should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or a third person and 
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~nich jces :~de~~ :~·~ ac~1 
en :ore-;::: ab l:::::: ;: ~t ·.,/: -:.:~ s-::: ~J..i1-i} :. 
i: inJ'-1.Stice =ar. o,~ r· ~ 1 _:l::',~ L l. 
the pr-::::.rnise. ~::e :=--::·~~le-:(:·· -:i.-1~:."':::::--'!.; 
be limited as J1~3t1~~~ ~-~-11J1~~s. 
(2) In deter~1n1r1? \~he~her 1nj~st1·;= ~3~ b~ 
avoided onJy b~· en~~rceme~t ~~ :~1e pr~m1s~, :~~ 
follo<-·ing circuf'istances are sic;n1 :icant: 
la) the availabilit·· and a~ecuacy ~: 
other remedies, particularly cancellation 
and restitution; 
(b) the definite and substantial char-
acter of the action or forbearance in relation 
to the remedy sought; 
(c) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance corroborates evidence of the 
making and terms of the promise, or the making 
and terms are otherwise established by clear 
and convincing evidence; 
Id) the reasonableness of the action or 
forbearance; 
(e) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance was foreseeable by the promiser. 
One factor in determinina whether in~ust1ce can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise is t:'1e a"ail-
ability or adequacy of :ther remedies, particularly can-
cellation. 
adjacent space ~~as tn2 ·Jnly reason ~~atk1ns ; ~aber ren~wed 
their lease in 1979. ~a~k1r1s & Faber ~snare~ ~he l~ase and 
paid rent until SC:l r-e:c_isec 
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: ~her mu~ect ~ram the building because the failure of the 
,,romis<= Justified suspension of performance under the 
lease and cancellation of said lease. It would be unjust 
to hold Watkins & Faber to a lease which would never have 
been signed but for the promise which SCM refused to honor. 
POINT II. SCM IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON 
THE RECORDING ACT. 
SCM argued to the lower court that it was a bona 
fide purchaser under the recording act and has advanced 
that argument in its brief. The lower court ruled that 
the recording act was not applicable because Watkins & Faber 
was not attempting to enforce the oral promise for adjacent 
space. Even assuming for purposes of argument that the 
recording act applies to the oral promise given as consid-
eration for signing the 1979 renewal lease, in truth SCM 
'"as not a bona fide purchaser because it knowingly assumed 
the risk of claims and liabilities arising as a result of 
SCM's later actions which conflicted with prior unwritten 
tenant obligations. SCM's own purchase documents with 
Fischer show that SCM considered the possibility of un-
written obligations to tenants. For the purpose of showing 
that SCM considered the risk and knowingly incurred some 
!1ab1lity to tenants under the purchase agreement with Fischer, 
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SCM and Fischer. 1 R-197). 
the Exchange Agreement, Exhibit 40, paragra~n 6 ~f which 
states as follows: 
Indemnification. Company hereby agrees to 
indemnify and hold Fischer harmless from and 
against all claims and liabilities arising out 
of the ownership, operation and management of the 
Fischer Property from and after the Fischer 
Property Transfer Date. 
On the other side, the lower court admitted the Assignment 
of the Tenant Leases, Exhibit lP, paragraph 2 of which 
states as follows: 
It is expressly agreed that Assignee 
shall have no authority or duty to negotiate, 
compromise or settle any unwritten obligations of 
Assignor. 
By the above wording, SCM acknowledged the possibility of 
unwritten obligations to tenants. The lower court erred 
by not admitting the Exchange Agreement because after SCM 
purchased the building, SCM entered into a long-term lease 
with IML thereby preventing fulfillment of the 1979 promise 
of adjacent space, an unwritten obligation to Appellant. 
The Assignment of Tenant Leases provides that SC~ had no 
authority or duty to negotiate, compromise ~r settle the 
lessor's unwritten obligations, but it cL=arly dces :10t 
relieve SCM from liability fer SCM's own actions thereafter 
which interferred with one sue:--. un·.vritten "enar." ·cbl~1ati•c:1. 
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By virtue of the Exchange Agreement, SCM specifically 
assumed all liability for SCM's actions which might have 
compromised unwritten obligations whose performance had not 
taken place. It is obvious from the wording of the two 
documents that SCM considered that its act_§ffOn could 
conflict with unwritten obligations Fischer owed to Newhouse 
tenants. Nevertheless, SCM consciously chose not to 
inquire of the Newhouse tenants, including Appellant, before 
it purchased the Newhouse Building and gave IML a long-term 
lease on the sixth floor. 
SCM's long-term lease of the sixth floor to IML 
conflicted with the unwritten promise of additional space 
to Appellant. Since SCM expressly assumed responsibility 
for its actions and was not a bona fide purchaser, it 
should not be allowed to deny the promise and prevent 
termination of the 1979 lease. 
CONCLUSION 
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate 
Appellant's defense of failure of consideration. 
Even if the recording act were applicable to this 
situation, SCM is not a bona fide purchaser. The promise of 
adjacent office space was consideration for signing the 1979 
renewal lease. It would be unjust to hold Watkins & Faber 
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to a lease which would never have been si;ned but c_:cr tl:cc 
promise of adjacent space and deny any relief ~hatever far 
failure of the promise. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October, 
1983. 
WATKINS & FABER 
By 
Brian W. Burnett 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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